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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
:tv1a11y An1ericans look upon looting as a forei g11 and unusual event, yet nothing co11ld be
further from the truth. During the American Civil War, the New York City Draft Riot was
accompanied by looting and the riot did not end until weary troops returning from the Battle
1
of Gettysburg were sent to the city.
Other American wars were also associated with looting and rioting. Chicago rioted in
1919 and Harlem rioted in 1943. However, riots and looting reached a peak in the sixties
during the Vietnam Conflict. After the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4,
1968, riots and looting broke out in 125 cities in 29 states. Thereafter, looting became a rare
event in America.
Reasons suggested for the decline in rioting and looting include the end to the Vietnam
Conflict or perhaps improvements in job opportunities and racial equality led to a reduction
in social tensions. Another possibility might have been related to the realization that looting
and riots destroyed the minimal infrastructure in the ghetto and made post looting life even
more difficult. For whatever reason, riot and looting events came to a sudden end and so did
academic interest in the issue.
Meanwhile, several major questions remained unanswered: What causes looting? Why
do individuals get involved? How do you end a looting event without making it worse ? In
1977, the City of New York suffered from a blackout which lasted 48 hours and precipitated
a major looting event. There were a few papers on the the event, but no substantial increase
in our understanding of looting events or how to control them.
After the New York City blackout looting, tranquility reigned in American cities for
another decade until Hurricane Hugo devastated the United States Virgin Islands on Septem
ber 17-18, 1990. The stu11n precipitated a major looting event on the island of St. Croix
which continued until most stores were empty. This was followed by smaller events precipi
tated by Hugo in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, San Juan, Puerto Rico and Charleston, South
Carolina. The San Francisco earthquake also precipitated a controlled looting event. Then
on July 28, 1990, a blackout in Chicago once again precipitated a looting event.
It appears that America has entered a new troublesome era where natural disasters will be
accompanied by destructive looting events. Hence public policy planners must learn to
understand and control post disaster looting. This is particularly important, if as predicted by
the National Hu11 icane Center, we have just started a 20 year cycle of severe hurricanes.
'

This report covers the results of resear·ch and analysis on the St, Croix looti ng event. The
key results answer tl1e following qL1estion s:
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Wr1at cat1ses looting- '?
~

Who participates in looting?
What does the community think about post-disaster looting?
Ho\v do yot1 control a looting event?
How is justice best served?
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WHAT CAUSES LOOTING?

(1968) studied riots and looting in 114 nations and reached the co11clusio11 that only
three factors were important in predicting community problems. They are: poverty, a prior
history of social strife and an illegitimate (unresponsive) government. In fact, most Ameri
can ghettos are characterized by chronic poverty and are populated by people alienated
against an unresponsive or ineffective government. In the sixties, most cities developed a
history ot· social strife including protest marches, riots and looting.
GLlIT

A riot or looting event usually starts with a precipitating event which places the commu
nity under severe stress and in which alienated poor people are exposed to opportunities
which would allow them to fulfill various needs.

What do people think about post disaster looting?
Over half of the sample populations from both St. Croix and St. Thomas believed that it
was reasonable to take food in the afte1rnath of a major disaster. Only 10 percent thought it
reasonable to take nonessential items like gold, jewelry or perfume.

Who gets involved in looting?
Those people who observe looting, who have idle time, who have no strong moral con
straints against the action and who see peers participating in looting, succumb to temptation
and join the mob action.

How do you control a looting event?
Recognizing that there are few moral constraints against casual looting, civil defense
forces and police departments should be prepared for the inevitable. The National Guard
should be in place prior to a predictable disaster. The response of mobilized units must be
strategic and timely because once an event gets out of control it will be more difficult to
restore order.
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Curfews and roadblocks will reduce the number of people who observe the event and
therefore reduce opportunity. Police should work on developing evidence with video cam
eras and voice recordings. Arresting people wastes time and reduces manpower on the street.
Often, during the pandemonium of large scale arrests, evide11ce is lost or misfiled. The
primary role should be to gather evidence that will stand up in court including the identifica
tion of tl1e looter.

•
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Ho,v is justice best served?
Since ic is impossible to arrest and convict 10,000 people, cases must be selected which
will stand up in court. Prior efforts have concentrated on ''celebrity'' co11victions but this is
not effective. Since half of the community condones some loot1ng , juries are prone to let off
casual looters no matter how pronunent they are. However, 90 percent disapprove or looting
for profit. Hence, a good tactic is to prosecute the people who stole excessive amounts or
who returned to loot again after they were released.
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INTRODUCTION
My first research into criminal activity was from a public policy perspective. There was
a crime wave in the Virgin Islands and Territorial Senator John A. Bell wanted to know what
was causing the crime and what could be done to reduce it. As a researcher for Senator Bell
'
my approach to the problem was pragmatic. I interviewed long terrn residents and spoke at
length with Assistant Commissioner of Public Safety, Anthon Christian.
After reviewing thirty years of government reports which chronicled social changes in the
territory. The picture which developed was that explosive development was causing migra
tion to the islands and that the new wealth was not being equitable distributed; natives were
still poor, and newcomers were gathering all the wealth. Additionally, many of the oider
residents complained that outside influences were damaging the moral standards of the
•
younger generauon .
•

I wrote an ''original'' paper covering these results which was distributed throughout the
territory. As the audience for the report grew, the response became less political and more
scholarly. Suggestions were made that I study the works of Durkheim, Merton, Sutherland,
Cressey, Cloward and others.
The theoretical literature of deviance or criminal activity is subdivided into several
different and often contradictory schools of thought. Because of this, no work on the subject
could be complete without a minimal discussion of Lombroso (social pathology), Durkheim
(social disorganization), Merton (anomie), Sutherland (differential association), Cloward
(differential opportunity) and Lemert (labeling).
Most criminologists recognize that each school makes a contribution to crime theory.
However, almost everyone working with crime theory recognizes that existing models are
incomplete otherwise contradictions would not be so apparent. What is needed is a new
perspective which would incorporate existing theories and knowledge into a comprehensive
paradigm of criminal activity.

••
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Perhaps theories of deviant behavior are so diverse because so many different acts are
described as criminal. When looking at models for looting, there are fewer options. Poverty
is accepted as a cause of looting, yet many poor areas and poor people do not engage in the
activity. Material gain has also been suggested despite the observation by many that grocery
stores are the most frequent target and luxury stores are often ignored. Still, a consensus
appears to be developing that poor people loot with material gain as the motivator.
In the afterr11ath of Hurricane Hugo in St. Croix, there \vas pandemic looting for three
days. Original estimates indicated that 10 to 20 percent of the population had participated
and there was virtually nothing that a small police department could do to stop tl1e looting.
V

While the looting was still going on, there was heated debate throughout the community on
how to stop it.
There were simply not enough police to arrest everyone because the primary missions of
the police department after the storrn were search and rescue related to preservation of life.
Some people were advocating killing a few looters as an example. This was not feasible
because many looters were women and children. It was inconceivable that senior personnel
would order a policeman to kill women and children and equally inconceivable that any
officer would carry out such an order. Also, it was well known by the upper echelon of the
department that during a riot, violence provokes more violence. The St. Croix looting was a
relatively peaceful event with one arson, one homicide and a few incidents of a potentially
violent nature.
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After the looting ended, many people pondered why it happened and what could be done
to prevent it in the future. By the end of October, I had finished a literature search on looting
for Assistant Commissioner Christian. Basically, the info1111ation on looting was disappoint
ing. It was limited in scope, over a decade old, and provided little insight into ending a
looting incident. The primary police technique was to contain the looting to a particular
geographical area and let it run its course.
In order to get an insight into the looting process, a questionnaire was designed to look at
the causes of looting and the motivation for individual participation. Over 300 people were
interviewed. When the results were analyzed, they were supportive of many of the social
theories. Generally speaking, people looted if they thought it was reasonable to do it. They
were also more likely to get involved if friends were looting. Moreover, poorer people were
more likely to believe that taking items after a sto1111 was reasonable activity. In fact, the
data on looting could be used to unify many of the existing social theories about criminal
• •
acuv1ty.
As an instructor of Marketing at the University of the Virgin Islands, I am familiar with
various models of consumer behavior. The more I studied the data, the more convinced I
became that an adaptation of consumer behavior models could be used to describe why a
population would loot and who would get involved. The model presented in this paper is
correct in predicting 88 percent of individual activity. This is far higher than any other
model of criminal participation.
Recognizing that public policy planners operate in a busy world, this report is divided
into two parts. Section one (Part 1) describes the model in detail assuming no knowledge of
consumer behavior or crime theory. Section two (Part 1) uses the model to develop control
techniques for a looting incident. This section was coauthored with Anthon Christian, Assis
tant Commissioner of Police for the United States Virgin Islands. Section three (Part I)
discusses the potential of the model becoming a general model of criminal activity and
directions for future research.
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Part 2 is also divided into tlrree sections. Section one (Part 2) revie'vvs the prior work and
existing theories of criminal activity in general a11d looting in particular. Section two (Part 2)
describes the detailed development of the model based on the Virgin Islands data. Section
three (Part 2) discusses the survey details and methodology. This section was coauthored
with William W. Saitta, Professor of Business, University of the Virgin Islands.
It is hoped that the first part will help serve the needs of policy planners and that the
second part will provide more complete details for those with a deeper interest in the theories
of deviant behavior.
•

In addition to the coauthors mentioned previously, I would like to thank Linda Johnson
for perfo111ling the surveys on both St. Thomas and St. Croix. Special thanks must be ex
tended to Anita Gordon-Plaskett, Assistant Professor of Education at the University of the
Virgin Islands, for providing encouragement and guidance during the course of this study.
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THE MODEL FOR LOOTING
When discussir1g looting, there are two diffe1·ent types of participation: macroscopic and
microscopic. On the macroscopic scale, the concern is over which communities will loot and
what causes the mob action. On a microscopic scale, the primary question is which individu
als will participate. To prevent looting, it is necessary to understand the macroscopic prob
lem. To control the crowd, it is necessary to understand why individuals participate.
A review of the literature indicates that the macroscopic problem is covered fairly well by
social theories. Specifically, the work of Gurr (1968) seems to describe the breakdown of
community controls. Individual participation has not been well studied and the results are
inconclusive. The post-Hugo looting studies on St. Croix have led to the development of a
model of individual participation which helped in developing control tactics. Because the
breakdown of social controls and individual participation are somewhat related, both aspects
must be covered with macroscopic or community problem being presented frrst.

The Sociological Causes of Looting
The studies of mass movements and political extremism indicate that the weakest support
for political institutions is found among people who are most remote from the power system.
Furtherrnore, powerless and alienated people act in a resentful manner which may be trans
lated into action by vandalism, littering or voting against various referendums. None of these
actions threaten the existing social structure to the extent that looting does.
In a study of turrnoil in 114 nations, Gurr (1968) found that ''only three variables are
direct and important causes of turrnoil: long-ter111 deprivation, a history of social strife and
the legitimacy of the political system. These three variables control or mediate the effects of
all others." Perhaps the work of Gurr is not well known because the results are not politically
acceptable but in the case of St. Croix, the model appears to fit. Both St. Thomas and St.
Croix are equally poor and during this century there is a similar pattern of strife. Where the
two islands seem to differ is over the legitimacy of the political system.
For over two hundred years, the islands were governed by two municipal councils. Each
raised its own revenues and each passed its own laws. As economic conditions changed,
residents would migrate between the two islands until conditions were once again balanced.
In 1954, the Congress of the United States capriciously changed the system without consent
of the native population. One legislature was created with the seat of power on St. Thomas.
By 1968, two thirds of all government workers were centered on that island. To get a simple
business license on St. Croix, the paperwork must pass between the islands three times. To
get complex problems resolved, residents must travel to St. Thomas. Many Attorneys resid
ing on St. Croix refuse to l1andle simple cases like personal bankruptcy because of the time
and expense wasted in traveling to St. Thomas .

•
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The post-Hugo survey in the Virgin Islands asked people on both St. Thomas and St.
Croix to rate ten different social conditio11s and government services. The results 1·eflected
the alienation of St. Croix. With the exception of housing which is a critical problem on both
islands, the residents of St. Croix rated every other area poorer than St. Thomas. The differ
ences were both meaningful and statistically significant. For instance, residents of both
islands rated V. I. Government services, the legal system including courts, employment
opportunities and police practices as the next four critical problems but with a difference. On
average, residents of St. Croix rated the areas poor 52 percent of the time while on St. Tho
mas these same services were rated poor only 21 percent of the time. As pointed out by
Broom and Selznick (1963), political negativism is one product of alienation.
In addition to an alienated community which is distrustful of the political system, there
must be a precipitating event. In some very alienated communities, very minor events have
•
triggered riots. In other communities, an irresponsible or misunderstood police action triggers the riot. In the case of St. Croix, there can be no doubt that stress created by Hurricane
Hugo was the precipitating event.
It is unfortunate that the macroscopic model by Gurr is so accurate in predicting mob
action because it provides police and Civil Defense personnel little insight into preventing or
controlling post-disaster looting events. The federal government has been fighting a war on
poverty for twenty years without much success and funding for this effort seems to be run
ning out. Additionally, municipal governments do not have many options for solving ghetto
problems because there are no easy or apparent solutions to poverty or improving services
among the poor. Thus, any city with poor alienated districts (particularly if those districts
have a history of mob actions or gangs) must expect post disaster disturbances.
Finally, no discussion of civil unrest can be complete without discussing the relationship
between police action and riots. With the extreme repressiveness of Israeli troops in occu
pied territories or South African Security Forces, it may be possible to prevent a riot with an
excessive and brutal use of force. However, in exploring prevention of riots, Gurr looked at
police action. He found only a 7 percent correlation between police action and riot preven
tion in his 114 nation study. Meanwhile, The U.S. Riot Commission (1968) found that as
many as 50 percent of riots in America were precipitated by a police action. Thus, the
improper utilization of police resources could be more damaging than helpful .
•

It is obvious, from this perspective, that riots are a political problem and not a problem of
the police or civil defense. Yet, this conclusion is unacceptable. Poverty and alienation
cannot be eliminated overnight. Moreover, post disaster looting destroys the limited infra
structure that poor people are dependent upon. If police and civil defense cannot prevent
looti11g, they must learn to control it. Thus, it is important to understand individual motiva
tion and develop strategies that minimize potential rewards. The next section discuses why
individuals participate in looting and what motivates them.

•
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A 1\-lodel for Individual Participation in Looti11g

The model developed in this section is built on consumer behavior and fortunately for
ease of understanding, everyone reading this report is a consumer. Millions of dollars are
spent each year trying to understand consumer behavior, and the reason is simple. A better
understanding of· consumer behavior will i1elp maximize the efficiency of the $9 lJillion spent
each year on advertising.
One model of consumer behavior presented by Engle, Warshaw and Kinnear is called the
Hierarchy of Effects. Quite simply, a person becomes aware of a decision opportunity and
makes an evaluation of the options within their existing belief system. The sum of these
beliefs shape an attitude. In addition to personal beliefs, a need to confor1n to community
standards is important in developing an attitude. An intention is for 111ed from your own
per~onal attitude plus the influence of your immediate peer group. The need to yield to peer
pressure is far more important than the need to confo1111 to community standards because of
the close personal relationships which are involved. The hierarchy of effects model is pre
sented in Figure 1.
Perhaps an example will help clarify the situation. You wake up at 2 A.M. and are unable
to sleep. Rather than toss and turn, you decide to finish a project in your workshop. After a
hard six hours of work, you are thirsty and decide to take a well earned break. You evaluate
your thirst within your own beliefs and decide that a beer sounds great. Then you recognize
that it is only 8 A.M. and change your mind because it doesn't confo11n to community stan
dards. You decide that a soda would be just as effective but when you reach the kitchen,
your wife invites you to join her for a cup of coffee. Because you want the company, you
accept and enjoy a cup of coffee.
As pointed out by E11gle et. al., ''This [discussion] is no mere academic debate because if
there is no demonstrated relationship between belief, attitude and behavior most principles of
persuasion are invalidated. In the same sense, much of what advertising practitioners believe
and do also is invalidated.'' Clinical Psychologist Abraham Maslow (Maslow's ladder of
needs) reached a similar conclusion decades earlier when he pointed out that actions are
always consistent with values and beliefs (1970).
In addition to the hierarchy of effects model based on needs, there is a hierarchy of
beliefs based on controls. Most people have beliefs about controls which have been influ
enced by religion, family, culture and economic status. The sum of these beliefs help to
create an attitude about social controls and n1ost people confu1111 to these beliefs. Occasion
ally, intense feelings of alienation will override the control system and alter the intention to
act. In addition, the intention to act can be altered by economic reality.
'

Returning to our thiI·sty person exarr1ple, the person rnust also undergo a l1ierarchy of
effects based on co11trols before he can act. The person may believe that the closest place to
get a drink is dirty and that alternatives are too t·ar away. Tl1us, the intention to act based on
need is thwarted by control beliefs.
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•

Intention to Act
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Figure 1: The Hierarchy of Effects Model in Extended Problem Sol\-'ing
(Engel, Warshaw, Kinnear p. 201)
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011 the other hand, the person may get to a soda machine which is broken and keeps half
his change. As lie adds more cl1ange and loses it in an attempt to get a soda, the person
becomes alienated and all beliefs about control systems disintegrate. Subsequently, the
person vandalizes the machine in a final attempt to get a soda. Finally, even when an i11ten
tion is fo1111ed which is consistent with the existing control system, a person may not be able
to get a soda because he does not have enough mo11ey. 1'hus, economic considerations car1
alter intentions. In our no1r11al everyday world, people make hundreds of decisions each day
which satisfy needs and are still consistent with control systems.
There is one final consideration in our model which is impediments. In the case of the
thirsty person, he may intend to buy a soda from a functional machine and have the proper
change. Suddenly, before he can act, his boss catches him with an urgent message from his
spouse. Thirst is forgotten as the person runs to the phone .
•

The final decision making model based on consumer behavior is shown in Figure 2. The
needs hierarchy is shown on the left and the control hierarchy on the right. At this point in
our discussion, the model is for a consumer making a decision which involves a minimal
amount of thought. The underlying assumption in applying this model of consumer behavior
to looting is that individuals went through a minimal evaluation process before they partici
pated in looting.
The earliest looting on St. Croix was probably done by people taking advantage of oppor
tunities. Hugo destroyed widows and walls and spread consumer goods on the street. It was
easy for people to take advantage of opportunities. High exposure to prolonged stress and a
total lack of communication led many anxious people to seek out family and friends. On
Monday morning, after the sto1111, there was a steady flow of traffic and there were few
apparent police or National Guardsmen patrolling the streets. As people drove around, a vast
majority observed looting and knew people involved. They watched friends and acquaintan
ces looting with apparent immunity. As more people observed the event, more were tempted
to get involved. We will examine the St. Croix data to deterrnine what influenced people in
their decision not to participate. By increasing these barriers to participation, it should be
possible to control looting.
First and foremost was opportunity. 21 percent of the sample population did not have to
cope with the decision to loot because they never observed looting. An additional control on
opportunity involved the availability of time. When aggregate groups of looters and
non-looters were compared, it was dettrrnined that some people may have been too busy
with personal problems to loot. At the 1 percent probability level, non-looters had higher
rates of employment and more severe sturrn damage than looters. This was interpreted to
mean that people with obligations to both their family a11d an employer had little time le[t
over to loot. Thirty six percent fell into this classification.
An additional 15 percent observed looting but did not believe that it ,vas reasonable
behavior so they did not participate. Finally, 8 percent had no particular prohibitions against
looting but they did not see any of their friends involved in the action. After all these elimi-
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Figure 2: The Looting Model
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nations, the model would identity 20 percent as looters. These people observed lootino, had
~mple fre~ time, saw friends participating, and had no prohibitions against taking need~d
1te1:1s. This compares to the 16 percent of the population of St. Croix who were self pro
claimed looters and there was bound to be some under-reporting in a study of this nature.
I~ reality, there w~re_ so~e ~~sclassificat~ons of looters and non-looters but the accuracy
of this model for predicting 1nd1v1dual behavior was still remarkably high at 88 percent. The
following table shows where the 12 percent error occurred.

Table 1
Number Eliminated Total N=l90
Non-Looters

Looters

Did not observe looting

40

0

To busy with shelter and job

61

7*

Did not believe in action

28

0

Did not see peers

15

0

Would identify as looters

16*

23

* Incorrect

16

7

Percent of group which is correct

90%

77o/o

Eliminated Because

The control system part of the model was developed from theoretical considerations and
has not been as well studied as the impact of social influences on action. Talcott Parsons et.
al. (1953) were the frrst to use the concepts of alienation and confo11nity as opposites and to
point out that when alienated people become active, they act in an aggressive manner. Al
most every riot commission report refers to the alienation of the community where the riot
occurs and a common description of behavior is ''nihilistic''. It appears that when alienated
people are provoked to action, they respond nihilistically, or in other words, they reject all
beliefs about the control system.
Rational choice theorists (Mason, 1984; Chalmers & Shelton, 1975; Gunning, 1972)
advocate that individual participation in criminal activity is driven by a balance between the
rewards of a crime and and the amount of punishment an individual is likely to incur. It is
apparent from the hierarchy of eft·ects model presented here that an economic balance over
crime and punishment is only a small (but possibly important) part of the decision makir1g
process. Much like confo1rnity can balance or aggravate the effect of alienation, peer pres
sure can also mitigate or aggravate any economic balance over crime and punishment.
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Finally, observations during the looting event conf11rr1ed that impediments to action were
a part ot· the decision making process. People on a path to a store would divert to another
opportunity because of a natural barrier, a secure facility, the presence of an owner, a police
presence, etc. Impediments do not necessarily alter the intention to act, they redirect
people 's attention to alternate opportunities. These impediments will be discussed more fully
in t/-1e next sectior1 which is concerned witl1 bringir1g a looting incident under control.
Meanwhile, there are two important points to consider. First, looters are norr11al citizens
living in the community where the event occurs. They own their own home, have lived there
as long as other residents and are not necessarily unemployed or even living below federal
poverty levels. They come from the half of the population who believes it is reasonable to
take food if you need it. (Half of all looters thought it unreasonable for people to take gold,
jewelry or perfume.) The only differences between looters and amoral non-looters is that
looters were not busy, they saw an opportunity, and they saw their friends do it The concept
of ''wrong'' does not enter the decision making process.
The question avoided to this point is what causes people to perceive theft as reasonable.
When the beliefs of Whites in St. Croix were compared to those of Hispanics and Blacks in
the Virgin Islands, it was found that the forrner group was indeed different from the latter
two. However, when the groups were separated along economic lines, there were no cultural
differences. Poor Whites thought exactly like poor Hispanics and Blacks. Conversely,
wealthier Hispanics and Blacks think the same as rich Whites. The apparent moral superior
ity of Whites in the Virgin Islands simply indicates that Whites are wealthier.
While the reasons for individual participation in looting are organized by the hierarchy of
effects model, individual actions are still consistent with the community model proposed by
Gurr who postulated that chronic poverty played an important role. On an individual basis,
chronic poverty alters the value system and allows poor people to participate without moral
conflict. Gurr also postulated that an illegitimate political system was a factor. Meanwhile,
Parsons, et. al., pointed out that alienation is responsible for aggressive behavior. Thus, on
the community scale, an illogical political system creates tension and alienation; on an
individual basis, alienated people become nihilistic and reject the controls of the political
system.
In closing this section, I would like to acknowledge the work of prior scholars. The
model for looting developed in this paper draws heavily on the hierarchy of effects model by
Engle et. al. Merton was concerned with the influence of poverty on crime, and Sutherland
thought that peer relationships were more important. Cloward built his theories on differen
tial opponunity and Maslow thought that actions must be consistent with beliefs. Parsons
pointed out the influence of alienation on aggressive action and Mason stressed the value of
jail as a deterrent. In fact, the human behavior model presented here accepts all of these
imponant contributions and places them in a hierarchy of effects v1hich assists us in under
standing a person's decision to either loot or not to loot. Now that we have a better under
standing of who will loot and why they participate, it is possible to evaluate prevention
techniques.
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CONTROLLING A LOOTING EVE NT
Prior theories of mob action are complex or incomplete with reference to individual
involvement in the looting event (Mason, 1984). The profile of looters which emerges from
this study shows that looting is almost accidental. The model which develops from this work
is simple and straightforward.
1. The community where the event occurs can be characterized by chronic poverty and
alienation against a nonresponsive government.
2. A precipitating event occurs which places the community under severe stress.
3. Opportunities develop for people to fulfill various needs .
•

4. Those people who observe the looting, who have spare time, who have no strong
moral constraints and who see their peers participating in looting, succumb to
temptation and join the mob action.
It will always be difficult for police departments to prevent or control looting because of
the large number of potential participants. Over half of the sample populations from both
islands had no moral constraints against taking food. Also, natural disasters create many
different criminal opportunities and in the case of a natural disaster the size of Hurricane
Hugo, there were almost no resources available.
During Hurricane Hugo, all able bodied policemen were on duty. At dawn when the
stor 1n subsided, some policemen were released for a needed rest and to check on their own
personal problems. The sto11n had completely destroyed one in five homes and one in two
was severely damaged. On average, St. Croix policemen are young with only a few years on
the job. When they found their homes destroyed and their families suffering, it was only
natural for many to make their personal problems their primary concern.
At best, 120 police would have been available and this number was split into two shifts of
60 policemen each. In St. Croix there are three police districts with a responsibility of
covering 30 square miles per district. Thus, there were about twenty police per district per
shift. Looting occurred in every district from one end of the island to the other. It started
spontaneously in many areas and crowds of 1,000 to 3,000 were operating simultaneously at
several locations. Meanwhile, the primary concern of the available police was preservation
of life and locating people who were missing due to the sto11n.
In this relatively hopeless situation, the police on duty could have shot looter·s which
would have been contrary to their search and rescue mission but even this extreme action
would not help a few policemen stop a fe w thousand looters. Overall, the post-Hugo survey
showed an estimated 10,000 people involved i11 looting and another 25,000 people observing
the event. In other communities, shootin g of unarmed criminals has led to large scale riots
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and further loss of life. If there had been an irresponsible police action, the results could
have been much worse. In this very large mob action, there was only one case ot· arson and
one death.
This difficult police situation was compounded by community mores. Half of the popula
tion believed that post-sto1rr1 looti11g ,vas a reasonable course of action, particularly with
regard to food and items related to shelter. At the time of the looting, rumors circulated that
it did not matter because the owners were protected by insurance, because storrn damaged
goods should not be sold to the public or because the owners were giving the merchandise
away. The widespread circulation of rumors contributed to the large number of people
involved.
United States Marshals and FBI Agents came to the territory and worked with Federal
Prosecutors to develop criminal charges against people involved in sto1111-related looting.
The tactic was to develop criminal charges against prominent local citizens, and once an
example was set, it was hoped that the larger group of ''no1n1al'' people would plead guilty
and save the expense of trial (Bryan charged 1989; Editorial 1989). Unfortunately, this tactic
backfired.
In the early cases, where there was a clear cut profit motive, three businessmen, who
looted from other businesses and sold the merchandise, were found guilty. For six other
defendants, where no profit motive was established, only one person, a relatively affluent
banker, was found guilty. The critical turning point occurred when a businessman accepted
restitution from an accused person and the person subsequently testified that merchandise
had been given away or given to him on credit. A local senator validated this claim by
testifying that he personally helped direct people to the goods and helped ''little old ladies''
load their cars up with various products.
Once people directly involved in the looting event unanimously testified that merchan
dise was given away, local jurors voted in a pattern that was consistent with community
mores. It was indeed reasonable for people to take private property after a disaster. Once it
became obvious that local juries would not find ''casual'' looters guilty, all prosecutions were
ended and less than a dozen out of an estimated 10,000 looters were brought to trial for
sto1111-related activities.
The circumstances presented show how difficult it is for police departments to prevent or
control looting. Police departments cannot alter community alienation nor can they change
community mores, but based on knowledge of looters, there is a course of action to be taken.
1. Police departments must plan for disaster related reduction in force and increased
demands for police services. Arrangements should be 1nade ahead of time to utilize
local marshals, retired policemen, auxiiiary police, firemen and other paramilitary
forces. Also, the local National Guard should be mobilized prior to the stor 111.
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This was done i11 South Carolina and led to greater control of post disaster looting.
The response of emergency perso11nel sl1ould be automatic when a disaster occurs.
This will save time and effort needed to track down people.
2. Any police response must be strategic and timely. Businesses and shopping malls in
St. Croix with limited access were able to block entries ·with motor vehicles or storr11
debris. Blocked access coupled with armed guards served to detour looters to easier
targets. With open drive-in access, no number of guards were sufficient to
prevent looting and, in the absence of armed guards, looters would remove any
blockage. Realistically, 60 to 100 on-duty officers are not sufficient to prevent looting
in any one of the three commercial districts in St. Croix, much less completely pre
vent it everywhere. Therefore, the police must concentrate on other strategies.
3. The two strongest looting deterrents to looting are curfews and roadblocks. A curfew
serves to reduce traffic flow after dark, and therefore, more forces can be reserved for
daytime control. Roadblocks would isolate the looting areas and prevent flow of
stolen property throughout the community. The police involved in disaster road
blocks should be assigned as close as possible to their homes. They should take the
cars home before hurricanes, tornadoes or other ''predictable'' disasters. Dispersing
the cars throughout the community will reduce the Pearl Harbor effect which occurs
when one disaster wipes out the whole fleet. Because the police cars are dispersed
throughout the community, procedures must be established so that roadblocks be
come automatic when looting starts, even in the absence of communications.
4. Police Departments should work with the business community. The police should
take a leadership roll in educating businessmen about the causes of looting and the
nature of looters. Signs should be distributed to businesses stating that it is store
policy that after a disaster looting is not covered by insurance, merchandise will not
~ be given away or sold on credit, and sto1111 damaged goods will be donated to charity
or sold at reduced prices. This step will remove the looter's defense in court.
5. Since arresting people takes valuable time and manpower, it is impossible for the
police to concentrate in this area. There are too many looters, too few police and the
primary function of the police organization is still preservation of life. The police
must concentrate on removing the profit motive of irresponsible citi~ens. Tl1e road
block should concentrate on handing out curfew notices and impounding the looted
goods. When people loot, they pack cars, trucks and shopping carts full of stolen
goods. The stolen goods are on open display and the question of illegal searches is of
minimal importance.
6. The primary tool for gathering evidence should be video cameras and these should be
available at every 1·oadblock along with at least 24 hours of film . O nce again, the
video camera shou ld be assigned to roadblock personnel well before t11e anticipated
impact. When a car packed with looted goods is stopped, tl1e vehicle, occupants and
the stolen goods should be filmed. The narrative should describe the goods, the
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names of the occupants, the license number of the vehicle and the dliver's license
number of the operator of the vehicle. The stolen goods should be unloaded, tl1e
driver's license confiscated, a receipt given and the people released. Since local
juries will only convict looters who do it for profit, police should review the tapes for
people who are multiple offenders or people with excessive amounts of stolen goods.
Juries will return a guilty verdict if excessive greed is proven. They are less likely to
convict people who steal for self-preservation.
7. Finally, the police should publicize their plan. Once people realize there is minimal
profit in looting and a good chance that greedy looters will be prosecuted and found
guilty, even more will avoid temptation. People will understand that looting is not a
communal event but an individual action for which they will be held responsible.
The effect Hurricane Hugo had on St. Croix was judged to be the worst natural disaster
ever to occur in America. It is unlikely that any other American community will suffer a
complete loss of phone service, television, radio and emergency communications. It is also
doubtful that any state would suffer a total disaster without a capacity for bringing in reserves
from other parts of the state. (Only Rhode Island and Delaware are small enough for this to
be a serious threat.) However, many cities could suffer similar disaster-related problems and
not have the necessary reserves to cope with the problem. The info1111ation learned from the
St. Croix looting event should help police departments plan for post-disaster looting.

OTHER USE OF THE LOOTING MODEL
Consumer behavior, like crirninal behavior, can follow several different patterns. The
hierarchy of effects model, used as the basis for the looting model, assumes a decision
making process where some modicum of evaluation takes place. As shown in this model,
actions may not always follow personal beliefs because of the socializing influences which
push an individual towards confo111iity with community standards. Meanwhile, closer peer
influences can be important in overriding or affi111Li11g personal beliefs and community
standards.
In both consumer theory (Engle et. al.) and social theory (Matsueda), actions will alter
future beliefs. When a high level decision is made contrary to personal beliefs (because of
peer pressure), beliefs may be altered. If the result was positive contrary to the original
beliefs, than the new beliefs will incorporate the positive result and be more favorable to the
action in the future. In the case of looting, this positive reinforcement is not likely to occur
because of the limited number of opportunities for action.
Because of the reinforcing effect that actions have on beliefs, high level decisions be
come routine after t·requent decision opportunities. A person is thirsty and without conscious
thought purchases an orange soda. Many criminal activities come to mind where an initially
high level decision may develop into a routine action. They include:
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1. drug abt1se
2. purse snatching
3. shoplifting
4. poverty driven crimes to fulfill basic need
5. crime needed to support a drug habit
6. perhaps, non-violent crime in general
The original model was used to understand looters and develop control procedures for
looting. -P erhaps this same model could be used to provide insights into understanding and
eventually controlling the above mentioned problems. However, before this can happen, it
will be necessary to explore a specific criminal act such as drug abuse within the context of
the model.

REVIEW OF PRIOR WORK AND THEORIES ON LOOTING
According to local and national press reports, Hurricane Hugo was the greatest natural
disaster to hit the Virgin Islands or America in over a century, and the people on all three
islands responded in a different manner. There was no looting on St. John, limited and
controlled looting on St. Thomas, and widespread and uncontrolled looting on St. Croix. The
looting on St. Croix started in Frederiksted before the sto1rn was over (early Monday morn
ing) and was almost complete by noon.
Throughout the rest of St. Croix, looting started by mid-morning and reached a peak on
Tuesday. By Wednesday, public and private security forces were starting to bring control to
the island. During the looting, and in the afterrnath, responsible people were asking: ''Why
did it happen and what made people get involved?''
To answer these questions it is info11native to look at some of the post riot research done
in other areas. In July 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson was concerned that the rioting in
major cities was communist inspired to hamper the war effort in Vietnam. He appointed the
U. S. Riot Commission to explore that possibility. The commission could not find any
communist conspiracy, but they reported some very unexpected conclusions.
Specifically, the U. S. Riot Gommission ( 1968) found that ''Our nation is moving towards
two societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal'' (p. 1). They fou11d that there
were twelve widespread grievances which could be ranked in three levels of intensity (pp.

7-8).
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First Level of Intensity
1. Police practices

2. Unemployment and underemployment
3. Inadeqt1ate housing

Second Level of Intensity
4. Inadequate education
5. Poor recreational facilities and progiams
6. Ineffectiveness of the political structure and grievance mechanism

Third Level of Intensity
7. Disrespectful white attitudes
8. Discriminatory administration of justice
9. Inadequacy of federal programs
10. Inadequacy of municipal services
11 . Discriminatory consumer and credit practices
12. Inadequate welfare programs.
Only one third of the grievances are due to a lack of economic activity in the inner city.
They are unemployment, poor housing, poor recreation and unavailable credit. Fully half are
due to the failures of government. Poor police practices, lack of grievance mechanisms and a
discriminatory administration of justice are pure governmental failures and education, federal
programs and municipal services are inadequate relative to the suburbs. The general conclu
sions reached by the commission are:
Social and economic conditions in the riot cities constituted a clear pattern of severe
disadvantage for [Blacks] compared to whites, \Vhether the [Blacks] had lived in the area
where the riot took place or outside it. [Blacks] had completed fewer years of education anci
fewer had attended high school. [Blacks] were twice as likely to be unemployed and three
times as likely to be in the unskilled and service jobs. [Blacks) earned 70 percent of the
income earned by whites and were more than t\vice as likely to be living in poverty. Al
though housing cost [Blacks] relatively more, they had \Vorse housing - three times as likely
to be overcrowded and substandard (p. 8).
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The saddest pan about the commissions' s poter1tial was b!ought to them by one of the
fi1·st \Vitnesses at the hearings, Dr. Kenneth B. Clark. Referring to the reports of earlier
commissions, he commented as follows:
I read the report... of the 1919 riot in Chicago and it is as if I were reading reports of the
investigating committee on the Harlern riot of 1943 or the report of the McCone commission
on the Watts riot. I must again say to you members of this commission - it is a kind of Alice
in Wonderland - with the same moving picture re-shown over and over again, the same
analysis, the same inaction.
Of course, the post Hugo looting was not necessarily a political action as was typical of
riot and looting in the 1960s. The spontaneous, wide spread event took place in the afterrriath
of a natural disaster. A well studied and more closely related event would be the New York
blackout looting of 1977 where a major electrical blackout plunged the city into darkness and
inactivated virtually all electrical powered equipment in some areas for as long as 48 hours.
In studying this event, Wohlenberg (1982) explored a very basic question frrst raised in a
New York Times editorial on July 28, 1977; ''Could it be that the civility we prize is related
unavoidably to prosperity?'' (p. 29). He also explored several interesting aspects of the 1977
looting. Neighborhoods with short te1111 residents were more likely to have looting than areas
with long tttrn residents; individual material gain appeared to be a prime motivator; there
were many people involved with no prior criminal record and there was not a specific racial
motivation involved as there was in the 1960s. Unfortunately, the principle predictor of
looting was still poverty. The poorest areas were most likely to engage in looting.
Merton (1980) is generally considered the leading theorist of deviant behavior and he
proposed that ''aberrant behavior may be regarded sociologically as a symptom of dissocia
tions between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing
these aspirations'' (p. 110). It is from this prospective that most turbulent situations in
America have been assessed. Historically, it is poor people who are most prone to riots and
looting and it is poor people who are not availed legitimate avenues for realizing their very
basic aspirations.
The relationship between crime, riots and poverty has been explored in depth but the
spontaneous development of riots and looting has not been readily explained. Before
Merton, Durkheim (1980) had been concerned as to when the regulatory functions of society
break down. He was concerned that the sudden shattering of goals would lead to deviant
behavior, Merton (1980) also predicted disorder when dreams were shattered. ''In so far as
one of the most general functions of social structure is to provide a basis for predictability
and regularity of social behavior, it l)ecomes increasingly limited in effectiveness as these
elements of the social structure become djssociated. At the extreme, predictability is mini
mized and what may be properly called anomie or cultural chaos Sllpervenes'' (p. 131).
Cloward ( 1980) superimposed one more critical concept on the shattering of dre:1ms and
that is opportunity. He recognized that there were ''differentials in availability of illegitimate
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means '' (p. 143). It is obvious thar a person who co.mmirs a crime must have the opportunity
to commit that crime. Natural disasters and blackouts provide opportunity from broker1
windows, deactivated alarms and an over-extended government. Under the conditions of
opportunity and shattered dreams, chaos occurs.
Wohlenberg's (1982) discussion of the New York looting event is consistent with these
concepts and his conclusions could not be more strongly stated: Tht1s support was found for
the contention that ''civility," in the sense of lawful conduct on the part of citizens, is related
to prosperity ... Apparently, people excluded from effective participation in the affluent
society did not, and cannot be expected to, act with restraint when the enforcement of law
and order is immobilized.... Unless a massive program to rebuild and revitalize central
cities is undertaken to improve the quality of life for those at the bottom of the income
distribution, the civility which we prize for our society will elude our grasp... the New York
data lends strong support to the idea that economic hardship leads to violence when social
controls are removed and the greatest concentrations of violence tend to be in the most
deprived neighborhoods. If future blackouts or other disruptions of public services occur,
authorities should expect looting (pp. 42-43).
•

Unfortunately, public officials in both New York and the Virgin Islands have concen
trated on prosecuting affluent looters - not the poor ones. As observed by Curvin and Porter,
public officials might be concentrating on affluent looters to obscure the fact that most
looting occurs in poverty areas.
A review of the literature sought to find weaknesses and criticisms of current riot theory.
In addition, more contemporary events were sought as comparisons.
As indicated by Liazos (1980), the vast majority of the literature of deviance is an attempt
to humanize and no1111alize the deviant. Yet, in a given looting incident, only a small number
of potential participants actually become involved. In St. Croix, 80 to 90 percent of the
population did not become involved. Thus, there should be some measurable difference
between those classified as looters and those who avoided the temptation to violate the law.
Quarantelli and Dynes (1968) took a different approach and reviewed looting as an index
of social change. They reject the hypothesis that looting is a manifestation of man's irratio
nality in a period of social disorganization. They start with the premise that property is not
an individual object but a shared ur1derstanding about who can do what with the valued
resources within a community. While the legal right does not change in a looting event, the
group consensus supporting the prerogative to appropriate valued resources in the commu
nity does shift among a segment of the population. Thus, looting involves the temporary and
localized redefinition of property rights by a minority of the population.
While most of the authors cited in this work are American, social problems, riors, looting,
commission reports and governmental apathy towards inner city poor are not a11 American
problem alone. In the Brixton section of London, there were riots and looting between April
10-12, 1981. While the neighborhood was racially mixed it was predominantly disenfran-
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chised West Indians who rioted. The report on the inquiry into the Brixton disorders was
prepared by Lord Scarman and the sad part about the document is that it looks like a rewrite
of earlier American reports.
As a community, Brixton had a housing shortage of 20,000 units and severe overcrowd
ing of occupied units. At the same time, the area had unoccupied housing \vhich led to
squatters and community conflict. 20 percent of occupied homes were substandard. The
area was also characterized by low levels of home ownership (22 percent).
Unemployment was high and among young West Indians, it was estimated to be 55
percent. An inadequate educational system led to high drop out rates. Also, there were
community complaints about inadequate recreational facilities. This combination of factors
led Lord Scarman to conclude:
The street corners become the social centers of people, young and old, good and bad,
with time on their hands and a continuing opportunity, which, doubtless, they use, to engage
in endless discussions of their grievances (Scarman, 1982, p. 22).
The West Indians of Brixton were under represented in local government and they felt
politically disenfranchised. Finally, Lord Scarman concluded that ''young black people face
the burden of discrimination, much of it hidden and some of it unconscious and unintended''
(Scarman, 1982, p. 28).
After all of his insightful research, Lord Scarman was less compassionate than his Ameri
can counterparts when he reached the following conclusion: The social conditions in Brixton
many of which are to be found in other inner city areas - do not provide an excuse for disor
der. They cannot justify attacks on the police in the streets, arson, or riot. All those who in
the course of the disorders in Brixton and elsewhere engaged in violence against the police
were guilty of grave criminal offenses, which society, if it is to survive, cannot condone.
Sympathy for, and understanding of, the plight of young black people, which I would expect
to find in British society now that the facts are widely known, are a good reason for political,
social and economic aid, and for a coordinated effort by government to provide it, but they
are no reasons for releasing young black people from the responsibility for public order
which they share with the rest of us - and with the police (Scarman, 1982, pp. 33-34).
Perhaps Lord Scarman is correct. Nothing can justify total anarchy, wide spread looting,
destruction of property, closing of businesses and loss of jobs, but that is not the purpose of
this work. The important questions are whether or not social disorders can be understood and
what can be done to control them.
'

STATEMENT OF THE PR()BLEl\il
Poverty alone is not the complete explanation for looting in Brixton, St. Croix or New
York City. Wohlenberg (1982) showed only a 51 percent correlation between looting and
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poverty while 49 percer1t of the variatior1 ren1ained unexplained. In the Virgin Islands, St.
·r·homas has many regio11s that are as poor as in St. Croix so other intangible differences must
exist
•

The research of Lang and Lang (1968) led them to the conclusion that any population is
capable of violent reaction. Wohlenberg (1982) modified this somewhat by suggesting that
whether any individuals will loot or not depends on whether or not there is looting going on
around them. Many individuals will not initiate looting or be the frrst to break into a store,
but once a store is being looted, they will participate in the event. Grimshaw (1968) got even
more specific when the''most large and heterogeneous societies experience domestic violence
during periods of rapid social change'' (p. 103). The past two years have seen rapid social
change. There has been a 20 percent population growth and a changing ethnic balance in the
•
community.
Yet, all of these factors cannot explain the magnitude of the looting in St. Croix and the
relative absence in St. Thomas. The island of St. Thomas also has a deprived underclass
suffering from unemployment, crime, drug abuse, poor housing and a substandard educa
tional system. They have also had to adapt to rapid population growth and changing ethnic
composition. Thus, other factors must be considered to explain the difference.
Berkowitz (1968) pointed out that ''privations in themselves are much less likely to breed
violence than is the dashing of hopes'' (p. 44 ). Gurr (1968) agrees with Berkowitz and
perhaps is even clearer when he states ''a little improvement accompanied by promises that
much improvement is to come raises expectations, and if much improvement does not come
when expected, perceptions of capabilities may drop, sometimes abruptly and sharply'' (p.
53). Nothing could have been more abrupt to dash hopes than Hurricane Hugo in St. Croix.
Yet, other communities suffer natural disasters without the degree of looting seen in St.
Croix. Unconfinned estimates were that 10-20 percent of the population were involved.
Allegedly, there were policemen, businessmen, government employees, clergymen, senators,
women and children and members of the National Guard involved in the event. No race or
ethnic group was immune to participation. The depth of community involvement had to
reflect wide spread community dissatisfaction and it is in the work of Gurr we find a major
clue to understanding the disorder.
After a review of turmoil in 114 Nations, Gurr (1968) found that ''only three variables are
direct and important causes of turmoil: long-te1111 deprivation, a history of strife, and the
legitimacy of the political system. These three variables control or mediate the effects of all
others'' (p. 61 ).
The work of Gurr (1968) focused on poverty, history and the legitimacy of the political
struc ture as predictors of social tu1111oil, yet it is obviously a11 evolutionary theory which built
011 earlier thought. It appears to be complete enough to cover politically in spired riots of the
sixties and co11temporary mob actions precipitated by natural disasters. It is within this
context that the St Croix looting event will be evaluated.
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DEVELOPING THE MODEJ..,
Like most social theories, the use of the hierarchy of effects model to describe individual
participating in looting is an evolutionary development. A review of looting and crime
theory sl1ows that there are two distinct perspectives of a mob action. The f1rst concern is
over the cause of social disorgar1izatior1 in a particular community. The seco11d issue is to
dete1111ine why some individuals participate and others do not.
A literature review shows that most sociologists view mob action as the result of poverty
ai1d relative depravation. Historically, it is the poorest people who are prone to looting and
rioting. Residents of both St. Croix and St. Thomas were surveyed and contrary to this
perspective, were found to be substantially the same in te11ns of home ownership, unemploy
ment and income level.
The alternative hypothesis of mob action proposed by Gurr stresses that mob actions
involve poor people alienated from the political system. St. Croix residents were found to be
significantly more alienated than St. Thomas residents. After reviewing the history of civil
strife in the Virgin Islands, this author reached the conclusion that alienation in St. Croix and
hence the looting has its origins in geopolitical isolation. (A complete report of the history of
social strife in the Virgin Islands will be published later this year in Caribbean Perspectives.)
The hypothesis proposed by Gurr appears to be consistent with the post-hurricane looting in
St. Croix. Unfortunately, this model provides little real insight into controlling post-disaster
looting once it has started.
Evaluation of individual participation in a looting event is far more complex. Sociolo
gists, by definition, are not concerned with individual activity except to the extent it is part of
or provoked by a larger social movement. They are trying to study global (community) or
aggregate (the sum of individual) actions. Many criminologist who are concerned with
individual actions try to scale down social theories of community action to individual partici
pation with little success. It is true that poor neighborhoods have higher crime rates than rich
ones. However, it is also true that many people are poor but honest and some rich people
engage in criminal activity. Thus poverty alone is not a strong predictor of individual participation in criminal activity.
Moreover, the post-Hugo looting survey and also a general population health survey
showed that both St. Croix and St. Thomas are equally poor with median annual family
income of $16,000 per year. Still there was only very limited looting on St. Thomas. Fur
the1111ore, looters on St. Croix were not significantly different in tc1111s of either annual family
income or home ownership. However the data did directly support several major social
theories.
'

Cloward's theory of differential opportunity was found to be important in that some
people never saw the looting or were simply too busy to loot, There was support for
Sutherland's concept of differential association. Everyone who participated in looting kne\1/
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or!1er participants. Also, there was support for the work of Maslow in that actions were

found to be consistent with beliefs. Every looter tl1ought that it was reasonable to take
something after the sto11n.
A further evaluation of the data looked to find the influence of culture and income level
on beliefs. Since actions were consistent with beliefs, it is important to understand the
influences which help shape a persons belief system. The Virgin Islands has fot1r large
cultural groups living on the island. They are Hispanics, Blacks from other Eastern Carib
bean nations of predominately British colonial culture, native born Virgin Islanders and
whites from the continental United States. On frrst evaluation, the frrst three groups are
similar and whites are different. However, when beliefs were re-evaluated along income
lines it was found that poor whites from the United States thought exactly like poor people of
Caribbean origin and wealthier people of Caribbean origin thought just like rich whites from
the United States. Thus the important contributions made by Merton which related criminal
activity to poverty are confl.l1ned on an individual basis. Poor people seem to have a belief
system which views looting as acceptable behavior. It became apparent from the data evalu
ation that each of the leading social scientists had made a major contribution to understand
ing individual participation in crime. The hierarchy of effects model was used to bring the
various theories into proper perspective. In this paradigm of looting shown in Figure 3, the
principle social theories are shown in proper perspective. Thus, while no one social theory is
sufficient in predicting individual behavior, the hierarchy of effects paradigm allows us to
understand the interrelationships between socializing influences and controls on individual
participation in criminal activity.
Referring to Figure 3, the decision making process starts with a decision opportunity. As
pointed out by Cloward, opportunities are not equally available to all people. Therefore,
some people will do good because they do not have the opportunity to do bad. Clinical
psychologist, Abraham Maslow of Maslow ' s ladder fame, believed that actions were consis
tent with beliefs. If people did something wrong, it was because they were acting on flawed
info1111ation or beliefs. In the looter profile, actions were found to be consistent with the
belief system.
Merton developed the relationship between criminal activity and poverty. In this work,
we found that there is a strong influence of poverty on the belief system. Poor people are
more likely to believe that taking items after a natural disaster is reasonable whereas rich
people find the action intolerable. Talcott Parsons developed the concept of confor1nity and
alienation as opposite and that alienation is a precondition for aggressive behavior.
Sutherland's concept of differential association was confrrn1ed in that every looter saw
people they know participating in the event. This work did not directly measure the impact
of economic balances or impediments to looting, but they are included for complete11ess. A11
article by Mason ( 1984) stresses the economic balance of riot participation.
Contributions from consumer behavior specialist ir1clude the development of the
hierarchy of effects model by Engle, et. al.. Another importan t contributor is Fishbein who
developed the concepts that the sum of beliefs helped create an attitude towards an action and
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that the intention to act wo1Jld be fo1 rned from that attitude plus socializing ir1tluences of
community norrns and peer group standards. The objective of developing consumer models
is to alter behavior by understanding the implications of any marketing action. For instance,
altering the economic balance is only one small part of promotion strategy. Likewise, im
pediments to action are another small part of the program. By developing positive consumer
attitudes, marketers can sell difficult to fmd items which are only available at speciality
shops.
When consumer behavior specialists are trying to alter behavior, the effort is targeted at
altering attitudes not at economic balances and impediments. It is unfortunate that crime
specialists have ignored this valuable lesson. Most anti-crime funding and effort is directed
at developing greater impediments to action or by creating mandatory sentences and building
more prisons. Until such time when more money is spent on altering attitudes and commu
nity standards by educating the public, we are not likely to ..yin any wars against crime or
drugs.

PROCEDURES
Sampling
In the aftt::1r11ath of a natural disaster, it is difficult to get a truly random sample in a
heterogeneous community. All phone lines were destroyed and many housing units were
destroyed. Techniques based on random phone surveys could not be applied because at the
time of the survey fewer than one third of the phones were working. The only common
factor was that almost everyone had to wait in lines. Since many public facilities were
destroyed during the sto11n, lines in the remaining stores, banks etc. were excessive.
A trained interviewer was sent to eight commercial areas where she asked people in lines
to fill out the fo1111. She was to advise people that their privacy and anonymity would be
guaranteed. There was little resistance offered to filling out fo1111s and substantially all were
complete. On St. Thomas no questionnaires (116) were rejected and on St. Croix 189 out of
193 were complete.
It would have been desirable to get a general population survey, however with the re
sources available, this was not possible. In the Virgin Islands, sampling in commercial areas
tends to eliminate rich residents who pay others to do their shopping and very poor people
who live on the street and do not get involved in a significant level of commercial activity. In
fact, this proved to be the case. When the income levels of the sample populations were
compared to those found in a general population survey (Schouten 1990), the sample popula
tions had fewer rich and poor than would be expected but the median income was the san1e
as found in the general population study.
The obvious question is whether findings from a sample population have any meaning.
The simplest answer is that they have meaning for the population sampled and also for the
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larger group that that sample \vas drawn from. In this case, the larger population \vhicl1 is
represented by the sample is the group of residents who visit banks, food stores and clothing
stores and who happen to have the same median income as the general population. The
surveys were started \Vithin 60 days of the sto1111 and con1pleted within 90 days.

Methodology
A survey forr11 was developed in order to collect background inforrriation on ethnic
origin, te11n of residency, home ownership, income level, employment status and sto1111
damage. Survey participants were also asked to rate se_lected social services and the local
government. The list of services was designed to be a local parallel to the nationwide com
plaints recorded in the U. S. Riot Commission Report (1968).

Statistical Procedures

•

,.

Group responses were evaluated by using a z-test (Difference of Two Proportions) to
deterrnine if there was a significant difference between the responses of the sample popula
tion from St. Croix and the sample population from St. Thomas.

'
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